After the dismal results of the French (and the Dutch) referendum(s) on the EU Constitutional treaty, the question mark in the sentence “Towards new borders?” looks indeed appropriate. To the extent there is anything in common between the “no” camps in the Netherlands and in France, this is a clear reluctance to further enlarge the Union – probably as an afterthought about last year’s enlargement. In both cases, the public’s preoccupations seems to have focused, however irrationally, in particular on Turkey. In the Netherlands this attitude has to do more with what we can call cultural clashes – basically the fear that Islamic fundamentalism can take roots among Muslim immigrants. The French, while not oblivious to this kind of concerns, seem more preoccupied with what we may call “the Turkish bricklayer” – a variant of the maçon polonnais, who figured so prominently in the referendum campaign, epitomizing the (largely imagined) imminent invasion of France by an army of cheap labourers bent on destroying the French social model. The French and the Dutch are not alone. Angela Merkel in Germany has openly voiced her party’s reservations about bringing Ankara on board. General elections are now scheduled in Germany for next autumn, i.e. at about the same time the EU will open formal negotiations on Turkish accession. I leave it to you to draw any conclusion on how all this may affect the length and the eventual outcome of the negotiations. Successive Italian governments, including the present one, have supported Turkey’s bid to join the Union – and the Italian public has never shown any misgiving in this regard. The Balkans is another issue the organizers raised for this panel’s discussion. As much as for Turkey, Italy has very good reasons for wanting all the successor states to the former Yugoslavia on board – plus Albania. Albania is actually the case in point, since it happened to us not long ago to find ourselves alone in shouldering the stabilization of that country. But it seems clear that beyond the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 – which I give for granted – the chances of a further enlargement encompassing the entire Balkan region anytime soon look slimmer after the French (and the Dutch) referendum(s). And if I say “Peccato” - It’s a pity – do not blame me as an unrepentant enlarger even in the face of louder and louder reservations toward enlargement. Joining this great engine of peace and prosperity which is the EU has been the unifying beacon for post-89 Europe. The transition from communism to democracy might have been much rougher without the political courage shown by Western leaders on both sides of the Atlantic in opening the door of our common institutions to the newcomers. If there is any region in Europe where peace is still at risk, this is the Balkans. If there is any region in Europe that needs the EU, this is the Balkans. “The lesson of the referendum in France and the debates elsewhere is not that enlargement should be abandoned, but that it should be anchored in a more open and democratic debate” – wrote Carl Bildt in the Financial Times just three days ago. “It is leadership that is called for if abandonment of the soft power of Europe and a slide into instability are to be avoided” he concluded. Let me just say that I fully agree with Carl Bildt. Well, almost. In fact I believe Europe also needs some more hard power. But this is an entirely different matter that I won’t pursue any further, lest leading our discussion astray. However, let’s think about it for a second. What is this soft power of Europe all about? Our being, yes, a military dwarf – but an economic giant. Now, my main concern these days is that even our great economic reputation may be in danger. The Economist has recently portrayed Italy as “the real sick man of Europe”. A title reserved to Germany up until a few months ago. France, with 12% of unemployment, does not seem to me to fare much better. And these three – you may notice - are the largest economies of the euro zone. What if the “the real sick man of Europe” is Europe itself? This very morning I was in Messina - together with the President of the EP, the President of the EU Commission and Italy’s foreign minister – to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Messina conference. Fifty years ago, Europe’s political journey had been called to a halt by the French Senate that, one year earlier, had rejected the European Defence Community. In that occasion, the process was re-started by the creation of the European Economic Community. The point I’m making is thus rather simple. The economy is once again the key to win back Europe’s political élan. Carrying out the Lisbon strategy – completing the single market, fostering innovation, implementing structural reforms in the labour, product and services markets – is the only chance left to us to restore growth and create jobs. I am among those, in fact, who believe that the room of manoeuvre for monetary and fiscal remedies to Europe’s virtual stagnation is close to zero. In other words, if we want to restore the public’s support to the EU political trajectory – including any further enlargement – we have to restore its confidence in the economy, i.e. Europe’s ability to create wealth and jobs. I have been put in charge of Italy’s effort to draft a national plan for jobs and growth – an exercise involving all the 25 EU member states and coordinated by the European Commission – and I intend to devote all my efforts in the coming months to achieve a successful outcome. I haven’t really touched upon the fourth topic for this panel’s discussion – transatlantic economic relations – in these brief remarks. But I assume our American friends are no less concerned than we are about Europe’s economic predicament and fed up, if not exhausted, of playing alone the role of the engine of world’s growth.